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1. INTRODUCTION
I am very pleased to be able to offer some reac-
tions to yet another masterful paper by Rubin on
the topic of causal inference. It is a special honor
to do so because the paper was initially presented
at Carnegie Mellon University as the 2005 Morris
H. DeGroot Memorial Lecture and I was in the au-
dience. “Morrie” DeGroot was my colleague, col-
laborator and close friend. He always raised ques-
tions about the naive use of randomization to answer
causal questions from experiments. Thus, I believe
that, had he been there to offer his own discussion
at Rubin’s oral presentation, he might have opined
on the two issues that I address below, although
perhaps with more wit.
The present paper fits quite naturally with Rubin
[12], where he discusses the problematic nature of
intermediate outcomes and R. A. Fisher’s failure to
recognize this problem. But this paper departs from
that earlier one by avoiding the presentation of the
key ideas using formal notation and equations. This
makes for an interesting story but also for difficulties
when one tries to follow the argument. The recipe for
the resolution of most complex causal questions, we
are told, is to frame them using potential outcomes
and principal stratification. This is all well and good,
but I still am not sure how to follow Rubin’s recipe,
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either for the stylized example he uses or in other
settings in the future.
2. ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATIONS FOR
CAUSAL INFERENCE
I share Rubin’s enthusiasm for representing causal
questions using the formal framework of counter-
factuals of which our philosophy colleagues are so
fond. Rubin refers to these using the label “poten-
tial outcomes,” harking back to Neyman’s [7]. The
reason I like this counterfactual representation is
that it forces one to represent everything in terms
of random variables, including randomization or any
other allocation or missingness (censoring) mecha-
nism; see [9, 10, 11]. Unfortunately, counterfactuals
by their very nature lead us to condition on “unob-
servables” and thus they violate de Finetti’s [3] dic-
tum that conditional probabilities only make sense
when we condition on actual observables, not simply
potential ones. This is at least in part why Dawid [1,
2] has attempted to present a framework for causal
inference similiar to Rubin’s but which avoids the
counterfactual representation. Lauritzen [6] has a
related graphical model approach to this which he
links to Pearl’s [8] notion of “fixing” treatments or
causes; see the similar ideas in [14].
My own preference is, as I suggested above, for
representing every quantity under consideration us-
ing random variables, whether observed or unob-
served, and then displaying these in graphical form
using the standard methods for directed acyclic
graphs. Thus, the act of randomization has a corre-
sponding random variable and its introduction
changes the graphical representation of the prob-
lem, often breaking the links between a treatment
and an outcome variable; for example, see [4], as
well as the more complete justification in [15]. This
has the virtue of sidestepping Pearl’s “unnatural”
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embellishments to the notation and representation
of causal effects.
This is a very long preamble to a plea: If the ar-
guments in the current paper are truly to hold sway,
then: (1) They must have formal representation so
we can see precisely where the assumptions fit in,
and (2) We need to formulate them using the differ-
ent causal representations, not simply the potential
outcome framework.
3. ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS FOR
CAUSAL EFFECT AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Rubin’s original arguments for the role of random-
ization in experiments (e.g., see [10]) explicitly ar-
gued for a definition of average causal effect (ACE)
based on a difference of expectations, and this sug-
gests that the definition is “model-free” although
the expectations are of course with respect to dis-
tributions that link to a model. I have always been
troubled by the seeming arbitrariness of this repre-
sentation. Why not the ratio or some other function
of the expectations (cf. [1])?
In fact, it is relatively simple to see that the defini-
tion of ACE is intimately tied to linear models, and
in recent work Sfer [13] and Fienberg and Sfer [5]
have shown that tying the definition of causal effect
to a formal parametric model resolves many of the
seeming issues of bias associated with the effects of
covariates in the nonlinear model setting. This is es-
pecially important for binary outcomes and for the
modeling of some forms of survival.
I would therefore argue that we need to recast the
principal stratification component of the present pa-
per in a formal modeling context and then represent
the censoring mechanisms in model-based terms as
well. Then I believe we might really have a take-
home lesson from the present paper on how to think
about complex issues of causation with intermediate
outcomes in the future.
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